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Abstract
The synchronisation of Tree Parity Machines (TPMs), has proven to
provide a valuable alternative concept for secure symmetric key exchange.
Yet, from a cryptographer’s point of view, authentication is at least as
important as a secure exchange of keys. Adding an authentication via
hashing e.g. is straightforward but with no relation to Neural Cryptogra-
phy. We consequently formulate an authenticated key exchange within
this concept. Another alternative, integrating a Zero-Knowledge protocol
into the synchronisation, is also presented. A Man-In-The-Middle attack
and even all currently known attacks, that are based on using identically
structured TPMs and synchronisation as well, can so be averted. This in
turn has practical consequences on using the trajectory in weight space.
Both suggestions have the advantage of not affecting the previously ob-
served physics of this interacting system at all.
1 Introduction
The symmetric key exchange method based on the fast synchronisation of two
identically structured Tree Parity Machines (TPMs) was proposed by Kanter
and Kinzel [2]. Their exchange protocol is realized implicitly by a mutual adap-
tation process between two parties A and B, not involving large numbers and
methods from number theory [9].
Making sure, that the two parties involved are also allowed to perform this
protocol is the cryptographic process of (entity) authentication. In the area
of cryptography, authentication is an important step still before key exchange
or even the en-/decryption of information with an exchanged secret key [7].
Adding classical authentication e.g. via hashing to the Neural Cryptography
concept is straightforward but is not embedded into the concept itself. We
think it is thus desirable to formulate an authentication concept from within
Neural Cryptography, based on the original TPM synchronisation principle and
keeping the practical advantage of not operating on large numbers.
We first briefly recapitulate the parallel-weights version, in which weights
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are identical in both TPMs after synchronisation, using hebbian learning and
the so-called bit package variant of the protocol [2]. The anti-parallel-weights
version, using anti-hebbian learning and leading to inverted weights at the other
party, can be considered for our purpose as well but is omitted for brevity. The
notation A/B denotes equivalent operations for the parties A and B. A single
A or B denotes an operation which is specific to one of the parties.
The TPM consists of K hidden units (1 ≤ k ≤ K) in a single hidden-
layer with non-overlapping inputs and a single unit in the output-layer. The
particular tree structure has binary inputs, discrete weights and a single binary
output as depicted in Figure 1a.
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Figure 1: (a) The tree parity machine (TPM) generates a single output – the
parity of the outputs of the hidden units. (b) For mutual learning, outputs on
commonly given inputs are exchanged between the two parties A and B.
Each hidden unit k receives different N inputs xkj(t) (1 ≤ j ≤ N), lead-
ing to an input field of size K · N . The vector-components xkj(t) ∈ {−1, 1}
are random variables with zero mean and unit variance. They can e.g. be
coded as bits generated by a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) as pseudo-
random number generator. The output OA/B(t) ∈ {−1, 1}, given bounded
weights wA/Bkj (t) ∈ [−L,L] ⊆ Z (from input unit j to hidden unit k) and common
pseudo-random inputs xkj(t), is calculated by a parity function of the signs of
summations:
OA/B(t) =
K∏
k=1
yA/Bk (t)
=
K∏
k=1
σ

 N∑
j=1
wA/Bkj (t) xkj(t)

 . (1)
σ is a sign-function.
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Parties A and B start with an individual randomly generated initial weight
vector wA/B(t0) – their secret. After a set of b > 1 presented inputs, where b
denotes the size of the bit package, the corresponding b TPM outputs OA/B(t)
are exchanged over the public channel in one package (see Figure 1b). The
b sequences of hidden states yA/Bk (t) ∈ {−1, 1} are stored for the subsequent
learning process. A hebbian learning rule is applied to adapt the weights, using
the b outputs and b sequences of hidden states:
wA/Bkj (t) := w
A/B
kj (t− 1) +O
A/B(t) xkj(t) (2)
They are changed according to Equation 2 only on an agreement OA(t) = OB(t)
on the parties’ outputs. Furthermore, only weights of those hidden units are
changed, that agree with this output, i.e. if OA/B(t) = yA/Bk (t). Updated weights
are bound to stay in the maximum range [−L,L] ⊆ Z by reflection onto the
boundary values.
Synchrony is achieved when both parties have learned to produce each others
outputs. They remain synchronised (see Equation 2) and continue to produce
the same outputs on every commonly given input. This effect in particular
leads to common weight-vectors wA/B(t) in both TPMs in each following iter-
ation. These weights have never been communicated between the two parties
and can be used as a common time-dependent key for encryption and decryption
respectively.
A test for synchrony can of course not practically be defined by checking
whether weights in both nets have become identical. One rather tests on suc-
cessive equal outputs in a sufficiently large number of iterations tmin, such that
equal outputs by chance are excluded.
∀t ∈ [t′, · · · , t′ + tmin] : O
A(t) = OB(t) . (3)
The synchronisation time was found to be finite for discrete weights. It is
almost independent on N and scales with lnN for very large N , even in the
thermodynamic limit N → ∞. Furthermore, it is proportional to L2 [8]. Our
investigations confirmed that the average synchronisation time is distributed
and peaked around 400 for the parameters given in [2]. The number of bits
required to achieve synchronisation is lower than the size of the key [2, 8].
Secret key agreement based on interaction over a public insecure channel is also
discussed under information theoretic aspects by Maurer [6], also with regard
to unconditional security.
2 Authentication through secret common inputs
In the original key exchange protocol, the structure of the network, the involved
computations producing the output OA/B(t) (Equation 1), the adaptation-rule
(Equation 2 ) and especially the common inputs xkj(t) are public. The only
secrets involved are the different initial weights wA/Bkj (t0) of the two parties.
If they were not secret, the resulting keys could simply be calculated (by an
adversary), because all further computations are completely deterministic.
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An elegant solution to include authentication into the neural key exchange
protocol comes from the observation, that two parties A and B which do not
have the same input vectors
∀t : xA(t) 6= xB(t) (4)
cannot synchronise. Remember, that the aim of the two-party-system is to learn
each others outputs on commonly given inputs. Given different inputs, the two
parties are trying to learn completely different relations (two different nonlinear
mappings) between inputs xA/B(t) and outputs OA/B(t). Consequently, when
the two parties do not synchronise, there also will not be time-dependent equal
weights wA/B(t) and thus no exchange of a key. This again is exactly the service
one would want to restrict only to authorised parties employing an explicit
authentication.
We experimentally investigated the development of normalised sum of abso-
lute differences d(wA(t), wB(t)) ∈ [0, 1] over time for different offsets
∀t : xA(t) = xB(t+∆), ∆ ∈ N (5)
in the (pseudo-random) input-list and for completely different input-lists. The
first situation represents an attacker, who has a different initialisation of his
pseudo-random number generator. The second situation is typical for an at-
tacker with incomplete or even completely differently generated inputs. One
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0
1
10
different
offset zero
Figure 2: Distance d vs. the number of exchanged bits (iterations t) for offset
zero (successful authentication), offsets one and ten, as well as for completely
different inputs.
can observe in Figure 2, that the distance between two parties that do not pos-
sess the same inputs remains fluctuating within a certain limited range around
0.4 and never decreases towards zero. We also investigated different offsets with
the same qualitative outcome. Two parties with completely different inputs
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(although not realistic given a concrete and publicly known LFSR as pseudo
random number generator) show the same qualitative behaviour. Considering
the number of repulsive and attractive steps, one can constitute, that on aver-
age there must be as many repulsive as attractive steps for such a behaviour
(cf. [10]). Two parties having the same inputs (offset zero) soon decrease their
distance and synchronise.
Another test was performed with identical inputs but by imposing a cer-
tain percentage of equally distributed ‘noise’ on the communicated outputs of
one party. It allows to demonstrate the importance of common inputs for the
synchronisation process. If such a noise would appear only in a certain period,
the system would still synchronise but with a delay of roughly the length of the
noisy period plus the time used up for unsuccessful synchronisation before the
noisy period, which is thus not the interesting case.
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Figure 3: Peaks of the histogram (average over 1000 runs) of the iterations
necessary for synchronisation for different percentages of noise on the commu-
nicated output bits of one party. The curves for one and two percent noise were
omitted, as they almost match with the zero percent curve.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the distribution of synchronisation times is flat-
tened and biased towards longer times for increasing noise. Surprisingly, the
system can still synchronise even with highly noisy communication. Obviously,
the (coordinated) inputs basically determine the synchronisation. The aver-
age synchronisation time is of course increased as is the probability for a late
synchronisation.
A superficial explanation of the observed behaviour is, that the principle is
based on mutual learning from common inputs and thus on principle cannot
work with differing inputs. More concretely, the random walks with reflecting
boundaries performed by the weights in the iterative process now make uncorre-
lated moves and moves in the wrong direction (cf. [10, 11]). Two corresponding
components wAkj(t) and w
B
kj(t) now receive a different random component xkj(t)
5
of their (differing) input vectors (cf. Equation 1). The distance between the
components is thus no longer successively reduced to zero after each bounding
operation and the two parties diverge.
The non-synchronisation in the case of no common inputs, therefore enables
us to incorporate authentication by keeping the common (pseudo-random) in-
puts xA/B(t) secret between the two parties in addition to their individual secret
(random) initial weights wA/B(t0). There are 2
KN − 1 possible common inputs
as second initial secrets, which is a large enough practical amount for the pa-
rameters as chosen in [2] that makes brute force attacks computationally very
expensive. Even more, a Man-In-The-Middle attack and all other currently
known attacks [5, 3] using TPMs are averted on principal by such an authen-
tication. It is important to note, that such a second secret does not represent
any principal disadvantage, because a basic common information is always also
necessary in other authentication protocols (cf. [7]).
As opposed to asymmetric approaches in which a third party that can be
trusted issues a second public key, in this symmetric approach a second secret
information is necessary for authentication, with the advantage of not requiring
a central authority. Using an asymmetric public-key authentication like e.g. in
the Fiat-Shamir authentication scheme, a trusted center selects and publishes
an RSA-like modulus, which is the second common (but public) information in
addition to the private key. Therefore security is partly transferred to a third
trusted party.
3 Embedding a Zero-Knowledge protocol
Although we have authentication already given the second secret described
above, we make another suggestion explicitly incorporating a Zero-Knowledge
(ZK) protocol (see e.g. [7]). It also requires a (second) secret but formally
does not require the non-synchronisation in case of differing inputs. Although
this may seem redundant at first glance, it allows to demonstrate how the two
(already) interactive protocols can be merged and allow a quicker authentica-
tion at the cost of an only statistical and thresholded secure authentication.
ZK mechanisms generally allow to split a protocol into an iterative process of
relatively light transactions, instead of a single (heavy) transmission. Typically
such a principle depends on random numbers in some way. The security that
can be achieved is probabilistic, i.e. depending on the number of interactions,
but security can always be increased beyond some acceptable variable security
threshold.
Again we take the inputs of the TPM as a second common secret. The
probability of an input vector xA/B(t) having a particular parity p ∈ {0, 1} is
0.5. This parity will now be used directly as an output bit OA/B(t) for an
authentication step. The probability of both parties having the same output bit
upon a given input at any given time t is
P (OA(t) = p = OB(t)) = 1/2. (6)
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Given a number n (1 ≤ n ≤ α) of pure authentication steps, in which one
transmits the parity of the corresponding input vector as output OA/B directly,
the probability that the two parties subsequently produce the same output n
times (and thus are likely to have the same n inputs) decreases exponentially
with n
P (OA(n) = OB(n)) = 1/2n ; ∀n . (7)
Consequently, in order to have a statistical security of ǫ ∈ [0, 1[ one has to pick
n = α authentication steps such that
1− 1/2α ≥ ǫ (8)
which can be calculated in advance as
α =
⌈
log
2
(
1
1− ǫ
)⌉
. (9)
One achieves a statistical security ǫ = 0.9999 (i.e. 99.9999 %) with α = 14,
for example. The synchronisation time for the ZK variant thus increases by α
authentication-steps depending on the required level of security ǫ.
The questions arises, when to perform those authentication steps and what
happens in the case of a synchronisation earlier than authentication, which is
possible due to the distribution of synchronisation times? One obviously has
to pick those entries in the input list used for authentication only such that
the security threshold will be reached soon enough with a certain probability.
This can be achieved by selecting a certain bit sub-pattern in the input vector.
Inputs are equally distributed by definition and thus the last say m bit are also
equally distributed. One can thus select those entries that possess a defined bit
sub-pattern (e.g. ‘0101’ for m = 4). The probability of such a fixed bit sub-
pattern ofm bit to occur is 1/2m, because each bit has a certain fixed value with
a probability of 0.5 and the individual bits occur independently from the LFSR.
Thus for four bit, on average every 16th input would be used for authentication.
When this sub-pattern occurs, one performs an authentication step in transmit-
ting the parity of the corresponding input vector directly as output OA/B(n).
This will (definitely) only happen at the other party (and with the same output!)
if it has the same inputs. Having successfully performed α authentication-steps,
one commences with the synchronisation and key exchange.
Such an authentication does not influence the learning process at all, which
transfers all behaviour of the TPM synchronisation to this extended principle.
Due to the fact that the inputs are secret, an attacker cannot know when exactly
such an authentication step is happening. This e.g. would not be the case, if
one would reserve the first iterations only for authentication. An attacker could
just record one session and replay the authentication steps (using the recorded
outputs) when performing his attack.
Let us elaborate on three important properties of a ZK protocol (cf. e.g. [7])
and see how they apply in the context of proposed authentication principles:
1. Completeness – A always succeeds in convincing B if he knows the com-
mon secret: If A knows the common secret in the form of having the same
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inputs, he will always synchronise within a finite time (typically around
400 iterations for the parameters used in [2]). In the case of the second au-
thentication principle, A will reach the security threshold ǫ in the specified
α authentication steps. Thus both protocols are complete.
2. Soundness – A succeeds with (arbitrary) small probability if he does not
know the secret of B: If A does not know the common secret and has
different inputs, synchronisation will fail. The two parties will always be
driven apart again by the repulsive steps. He will thus succeed with a
probability of zero. In the case of the explicit authentication principle, A
will not reach the security threshold ǫ in the specified α authentication
steps and will be rejected. Thus both protocols are sound.
3. Zero-Knowledge – No information on the common secret is leaked at all
while the interactive protocol is performed. This property can be at-
tributed back to the lack of information in the transmitted output bits
(or Bit Packages). The only information transmitted is the parities of
unknown bit-strings. The same holds for the parities of the inputs cho-
sen (pseudo-randomly) only for authentication in the case of the explicit
authentication principle. Again only the parities of randomly generated
input bit vectors are transmitted. An attacker also cannot distinguish an
authentication step from a synchronisation step from observing the ex-
changed outputs. He thus does not know, whether the currently observed
output bit is used for either of the two purposes if he does not know the
second secret. Both protocols thus possess the Zero-Knowledge property.
Both suggestions for authentication could after all be viewed as ZK protocols,
one implicit and one explicit, due to their interactive questioning nature that
does not reveal information on the common secret. Furthermore, any previous
findings on the physics of the synchronisation of TPMs still apply. Obviously,
the bit packaging variant of the protocol together with the ZK extension is a
typical parallel interaction protocol (cf. [7]). In such a parallel protocol, a num-
ber of problems (b outputs of party A) are posed an and a number of solutions
(b corresponding outputs of party B) at a time are asked. This is generally
used to reduce the number of interaction messages with a slow-response-time
connection or low-bandwidth channel.
The general trade-off in cryptography between available resources and the
required level of security also applies using the TPM principle. In many practical
embedded security solutions e.g. it is often admissive to provide a system safe
enough for the particular application, and given certain attack scenarios. The
TPM principle extended with the proposed authentication is very attractive
for such embedded applications due to its hardware-friendly basic operations
[12, 13].
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4 Consequences on using the weights’ trajectory
As mentioned in the introduction, once synchronous, the two parties remain
synchronised having identical weights in each following iteration. This mode of
operation was regarded potentially insecure by the authors in [4, 1] with respect
to the possible attacks with identical TPMs on the ongoing communication. We
would like to comment on that with two basic considerations:
1. When the two parties are synchronous they will also have the same out-
puts in each iteration. Thus, one can as well turn off the communication,
because all following outputs will be identical anyway and thus do not
need to be communicated any longer. Each party can then simply apply
the learning rule (Equation 2) with its own output. Consequently, staying
in the trajectory does not automatically represent a security weakness as
stated in [4, 1]. Only if a TPM attacker achieved to synchronise before or
at the same time as the two parties, he will have the keys from the trajec-
tory. But the problem of a possible attack on the ongoing communication
can be avoided as described above.
2. Given the herein proposed authentication refutes the currently known at-
tacks with TPMs on principle. An attacker with a TPM will not be
successful in synchronising, not even if the communication after synchro-
nisation goes on. This allows to securely exploit the full potential of the
trajectory.
In particular after having synchronised once, one can increase the final key
length by concatenating subsequently synchronised ‘partial-keys’ from the tra-
jectory at the negligible cost of one or a few further iterations, depending on
the partial-keys length and the desired final key length. Furthermore, one could
even encrypt each given data block to be transmitted securely with a separate
key, effectively yielding a one-time pad with a maximum length equal to the
length of the period (of the trajectory). In this case, even a less sophisticated
but low-cost encryption like simple XOR or LFSR becomes applicable.
There are 2KNL−1 theoretically possible K ·N ·L bit keys but the length of
the period (of the trajectory) has so far not been calculated. We also performed
software simulations and did not find two identical 612 bit keys in a million runs
not using the trajectory.
5 Conclusion
Two ways of establishing authentication from within the concept of Neural
Cryptography were presented. Next to the key establishment itself, such an
authentication is of primary interest in cryptography and its applications. Using
the common inputs as a second secret for authentication, we investigated the
distance of the two parties’ weight vectors for different offset in their inputs
and for completely different inputs. No synchronisation appears, as expected.
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Another explicit authentication principle (based on the same underyling secret),
naturally integrating a Zero-Knowledge protocol into the already interactive
key exchange concept was discussed and concrete suggestions for its application
were derived from probabilistic considerations. It turns out that authentication
is inherently provided by the underlying synchronisation principle of Neural
Cryptography.
Above all, using authentication of this kind averts all currently known at-
tacks and a previously possible Man-In-The-Middle attack, which assume the
full knowledge on the inputs to the TPMs. Any (non brute force) attack now
needs to extract information from the communicated outputs. Furthermore a
(differential) power analysis on a concrete software or hardware implementation
could be tried, which is yet an attack on a rather technical level. The outlined
consequences of being able to securely stay in the trajectory in weight space are
of significant practical importance.
It is thus our hope, that the discussion of this extraordinary key exchange
principle and related concepts (see e.g. [6]) will continue, within the physics
community and also the cryptography community.
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